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 II.-446 
SUBSTANTIALLY MUTATED: ARE GENETIC 
MUTATIONS “DISABILITIES” UNDER THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT? 
Abstract: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of disability to ensure that disabled Americans are given equal op-
portunity to participate in all aspects of life. Title I of the ADA, in particular, 
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of a disabil-
ity in all employment matters. Courts have struggled to consistently define which 
impairments constitute a disability under the statute. In June 2020, in Darby v. 
Childvine, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit seemingly ex-
panded ADA coverage by holding that Sherryl Darby plausibly alleged that she 
was disabled due to a genetic mutation. This Comment argues that the Sixth Cir-
cuit properly allowed Darby’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss, echoing the 
legislative intent behind the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act) became a 
landmark piece of civil rights legislation making discrimination on the basis of 
disability illegal.1 The Act garnered praise as the most extensive expansion of 
civil rights protections since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The passage of the 
ADA was particularly significant because statutory findings revealed systemic 
discrimination against disabled individuals who were being deprived of em-
                                                                                                                      
 1 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. July 26, 2020 marked the 
thirtieth anniversary of President George H.W. Bush’s signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA or the Act) into law. ADA 30th Anniversary, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., https://
www.ada.gov/30th_anniversary/index.html [https://perma.cc/BQ4N-HYQ3]. As he signed the ADA, 
President Bush expressed the hopes of lawmakers and civil rights activists that the Act would allow 
disabled Americans to participate fully in “the rich mosaic of the American mainstream” by guaran-
teeing equal access in all aspects of life and that it would serve as a necessary expansion of legal and 
civil rights. George H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (July 
26, 1990), https://www.ada.gov/ghw_bush_ada_remarks.html [https://perma.cc/4NGC-LN3V]. The 
ADA sought to end the discrimination and disenfranchisement of disabled Americans by obligating 
commercial facilities, employers, and public entities to open their doors in every way possible for 
such individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to eliminate dis-
crimination against disabled Americans in their everyday lives). 
 2 A Law for Every American, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1990, at A26 (proclaiming that the ADA not 
only allows for greater participation in society for disabled Americans but also broadens civil rights 
for all Americans). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark piece of legislation that outlawed 
discrimination in employment matters, voting rights, and public accommodations on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(1964). 
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ployment, access, and opportunities because of their impairments or perceived 
limitations.3 The Act sought to grant equal opportunity to disabled Americans 
to live a full and independent life, as well as to provide them with an avenue to 
redress discrimination.4 As such, the ADA created an affirmative duty of non-
discrimination in three areas: employment, public services, and commercial 
facilities.5 Title I of the ADA, which concerns employment matters, prohibits 
employers from making decisions with regard to a current or prospective em-
ployee’s disability.6 
Despite the ADA’s groundbreaking reach, the threshold issue for claim-
ants remains whether they are “disabled” under the ADA.7 Although Congress 
called for individualized inquiries in each case to ensure broad coverage, 
courts in the 1990s and early 2000s increasingly took the disability determina-
tion into their own hands, granting employers’ motions to dismiss instead of 
letting juries decide.8 
Recently, courts have had even more to consider, as medical advance-
ments, like genetic testing, have allowed physicians to identify more condi-
tions that may qualify as disabilities.9 Genetic testing provides valuable infor-
                                                                                                                      
 3 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)–(6). For example, the Department of Education published a study 
providing that students whose teachers regarded them as disabled were three times as likely to drop 
out after the ninth grade than their able-bodied peers. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, 
and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 420–21 (2000). Those same students were 40% less likely to 
take the SAT exam than their non-disabled classmates. Id. at 421. Additionally, a 1999 Census Bureau 
study revealed that around 50% of disabled adults in America were employed compared to over 80% 
of working-age adults without disabilities. Id. The employment numbers result in lower incomes for 
disabled populations and perpetuate a cycle of discrimination. Id. As a result, in 1990, disabled Amer-
icans were more than twice as likely to live in poverty than the general population. Id. at 422. 
 4 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(8), 104 Stat. 327 
(1990). 
 5 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). The ADA focuses its efforts in three major areas: employ-
ment (Title I), public services such as public transportation (Title II), and public accommodations and 
services, including privately-run commercial facilities (Title III). Americans with Disabilities Act 
§ 1(b). 
 6 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination by an employer against a disabled employee in 
job applications, hiring decisions, termination, compensation, and other employment terms). 
 7 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) (2020) (identifying the threshold issue of an ADA claim as whether 
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity and thus is disabled); see Darby v. 
Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that the court’s primary inquiry was wheth-
er Darby’s condition is a disability under the statute, the first prong of an ADA claim). 
 8 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv), (j)(3) (explaining that conducting an individualized assessment 
will almost always result in a finding that the individual is disabled and therefore covered under the 
Act); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 99, 115–16 (1999) (arguing that questions concerning whether an individual is disabled 
under the ADA should be determined through individualized inquiries decided by juries, not judges). 
 9 See, e.g., Darby, 964 F.3d at 445 (stating that the question in Darby’s case—whether her 
BRCA1 genetic mutation and abnormal epithelial cell growth constitutes a disability—was an issue of 
first impression at the circuit level). Genetic tests are performed using a blood or saliva sample, and 
they use an individual’s DNA to discover variants or mutations that indicate disease or an increased 
proclivity to develop a certain disease. Genetic Testing, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
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mation about an individual’s risk of developing genetically linked diseases like 
Alzheimer’s, diabetes, and breast cancer.10 Despite the benefits of genetic test-
ing, lawmakers were concerned that genetic information could create new op-
portunities for discrimination.11 In response to these growing concerns, Con-
gress passed the Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health 
insurance and employment.12 
In June 2020, in Darby v. Childvine, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit encountered an issue of first impression at the circuit level: 
whether a genetic mutation could be considered a disability under the ADA.13 
The court held that, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s BRCA1 genet-
ic mutation qualifies as a disability under the ADA.14 This pronouncement 
seemingly extended the bounds of the statute’s coverage to include genetic 
mutations.15 
                                                                                                                      
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/genomics/gtesting/genetic_testing.htm [https://perma.cc/7F7G-
WCZ2]. 
 10 See Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee 
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 719 (2019) (stating that genetic testing’s primary purpose is to discover 
whether an individual is at a greater risk of developing a wide range of diseases); Jessica L. Roberts, 
Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 439, 443 n.6 (2010) (explaining that genetic research has shown connections between genetic 
mutations and thousands of diseases, including Alzheimer’s and different cancers). 
 11 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), Pub. L. 110-233, § 2(5), 122 Stat. 881 
(2008) (codified in scattered section of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.) (establishing a federal law to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information after statutory findings that federal law did not 
sufficiently protect Americans from such discrimination). As genetic testing became cheaper and, 
thus, more prevalent, employers and insurers became increasingly able to make decisions based on an 
employee’s or a policy holder’s genetic makeup. Areheart, supra note 10, at 723. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) offered a hypothetical scenario in which an employee’s con-
ditional job offer is rescinded after her genetic testing results showed a heightened risk for cancer. 
Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 239–40 (2000). The employer in that scenario discriminated against 
the prospective employee on the basis of genetic information demonstrating the mere chance that the 
employee would develop cancer and become unfit for work. Id. In 1995, in anticipation of this issue, 
the EEOC established policy guidance explaining that the ADA could cover dormant genetic muta-
tions under the “regarded as” prong. Id. at 239; see infra note 29 (explaining that, under the ADA, 
individuals can establish that they are disabled if they are “regarded as disabled”). It is worth noting, 
however, that “[EEOC] guidance does not have the same force of law as a federal statute or regula-
tion,” and lawmakers still did not feel there was sufficient protection against genetic discrimination. 
Miller, supra, at 241. 
 12 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(5); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of genetic information in employment); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(F), (b) (pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information in health insurance enrollment eligibility 
and premium contributions). 
 13 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445. 
 14 Id. at 446; see infra note 64 (explaining the medical implications of the BRCA1 mutation). 
 15 See Darby, 964 F.3d at 446 (declaring it an issue of first impression at the circuit level whether a 
genetic disorder can be a disability under the ADA); Daniel Pasternak, Sixth Circuit Reverses Ohio Fed-
eral Court: Genetic Mutation Affecting Normal Cell Growth May Qualify as a Disability Under the ADA 
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This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that the 
BRCA1 genetic mutation was a disability under the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (ADAAA) and that Darby’s claim would not succeed under GINA.16 Part 
I of this Comment explains the statutory framework of the ADA, explores GI-
NA as a potential remedy, and sets forth the facts and procedural history of 
Darby.17 Part II discusses the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and the claim’s interaction 
with the ADAAA.18 Finally, Part III argues that the Sixth Circuit correctly al-
lowed Darby’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss.19 It also considers what 
Darby’s challenges would have looked like on remand, specifically the unlike-
lihood that Darby would succeed on a GINA claim.20 
I. MAKING A CASE FOR DISABLED AMERICANS 
In 2020, in Darby v. Childvine, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held, in a case of first impression, that a genetic mutation may qualify as 
a disability under the ADA.21 Section A of this Part explains the framework of 
the ADA and the requirements for making a claim under the statute.22 Section B 
explores Title II of GINA as an alternative remedy for discrimination claims.23 
Finally, Section C lays out the facts and procedural posture of Darby.24 
A. Defining “Disability” Under the ADA 
Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an 
employee based on his or her disability.25 To make a prima facie case under 
Title I of the ADA, individuals must prove that (1) they are disabled under 42 
                                                                                                                      
(US), SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: EMP. L. WORLDVIEW (July 14, 2020), https:// www.employmentlaw
worldview.com/sixth-circuit-reverses-ohio-federal-court-genetic-mutation-affecting-normal-cell-
growth-may-qualify-as-a-disability-under-the-ada-us/ [https://perma.cc/ZJL4-Q4ZN] (warning em-
ployers of increased liability exposure, explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s holding could give employ-
ees cognizable discrimination claims on the basis of genetic mutations under the ADA or GINA). 
 16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)–(B) (stating that courts should interpret the word “disability” in 
the ADA in favor of broad coverage consistent with the goals of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from discharging an employee be-
cause of the employee’s genetic information); Darby, 964 F.3d at 443 (noting that Darby’s employer 
was unaware of her BRCA1 mutation until pre-trial discovery). 
 17 See infra notes 21–72 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 73–115 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 116–127 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text. 
 21 Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 22 See infra notes 25–43 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
 25 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA’s stated purpose is “to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive national mandate” that prohibits discrimination against disabled 
Americans. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327 
(1990). 
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U.S.C. § 12102, (2) they were otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) 
they would not have been fired or adversely impacted but for their disability.26 
A disability need not be the sole cause of the employment decision to consti-
tute discrimination, but claimants must show that it was at least an animating 
factor.27 
Thus, for any ADA claim, the threshold issue is whether an individual is 
disabled within the meaning of the statute.28 To be “disabled” under the ADA, 
individuals must establish that they fall within one of the three § 12102(1) cat-
egories: (1) they have an impairment which substantially limits at least one 
major life activity, (2) they have a record of their disability, or (3) they are re-
garded as disabled.29 
Specifically, the first § 12102 category requires claimants to show that 
they are impaired and that the impairment “substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.”30 The Act does not define impairments that substantially 
limit at least one major life activity, but federal regulations provide a non-
exhaustive, illustrative list of physical and mental impairments that can rise to 
the level of disability under the statute.31 
To define “major life activities” in particular, the ADA provides another 
non-exhaustive list and suggests that an activity’s significance to the claimant 
is paramount to determining whether an impairment qualifies as a disability.32 
                                                                                                                      
 26 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Darby, 964 F.3d at 444. 
 27 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (establishing that the 
statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of one’s disability that is a “but for” cause of an adverse 
employment decision (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009))). Previously, 
courts relied on a more stringent standard requiring plaintiffs to show that their disability was the only 
factor in an employer’s adverse decision. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that a plaintiff must establish that her employer “discharged her solely because of the handi-
cap,” which espouses the former standard) (emphasis added). 
 28 See Darby, 964 F.3d at 444 (stating that to move forward on discrimination claims under the 
ADA, claimants must plausibly show they are actually disabled). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The statute states that “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an 
individual: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such 
impairment . . . .” Id. This Comment focuses on the first prong of the definition of disability: whether 
a condition substantially limits at least one major life activity. See Darby, 964 F.3d at 445 (analyzing 
whether Darby’s genetic mutation and epithelial cell growth substantially limited her major life activi-
ty of normal cell growth and was so severe as to warrant a double mastectomy). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 31 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2020); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (omitting examples of physical or 
mental impairments that would constitute a disability under the statute). The federal regulations’ list 
of impairments include: “(1) [a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, . . . respiratory . . . , cardio-
vascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory . . . ; or [a]ny mental or psycho-
logical disorder . . . “ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). 
 32 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B) (“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring 
for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . . and working . . . [and] also include[] the operation of a ma-
jor bodily function, including but not limited to . . . normal cell growth, . . . [among others].”). 
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The Supreme Court affirmed this understanding when, in 1998, in Bragdon v. 
Abbott, it held that the plain meaning of “major” in “major life activity” sug-
gested that determining whether a condition is a disability depends on the signif-
icance of the activity impaired.33 Section 12102, however, includes a wide range 
of life activities, such as taking care of oneself, walking, working, and bodily 
functions like normal cell growth, digestion, and reproductive functions.34 
To satisfy the “substantially limiting” requirement, claimants cannot 
simply show that a condition is capable of limiting a major life activity but 
instead must establish that it in fact does so.35 In other words, if a condition 
does not presently and substantially limit a major life activity, it will not quali-
fy as a disability under the ADA.36 Additionally, a condition that only results in 
a mere inconvenience will not be considered “substantially limiting” and thus 
will not rise to the level of a disability.37 
Additionally, the federal regulations provide rules of construction for 
evaluating a substantial limitation, explaining that conditions that substantially 
limit an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity, when compared to 
others in the general population’s ability to perform that same activity, satisfy 
§ 12102(1)(A).38 The regulations also explain that courts do not need to rely on 
scientific or medical evidence when comparing individuals to the general pop-
ulation.39 Moreover, the degree of limitation is not meant to be an exacting 
                                                                                                                      
 33 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) (stating that 
courts must not determine whether an activity is a “major life activity” under the ADA by evaluating 
whether it is “of central importance to daily life”). In 1998, in Bragdon v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that because the claimant’s human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) substantially limited 
reproduction, a major life activity, HIV was a disability as defined by the ADA. 524 U.S. at 641. The 
Court questioned the significance of reproduction to the claimant individually, however, noting that 
she neither wanted to have children nor believed that the HIV diagnosis would substantially limit her 
life. Id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In response to subsequent 
holdings that narrowed ADA coverage, Congress passed the ADAAA, which reinstated Congress’s 
intent for broad coverage by reiterating that courts should focus their inquiries on whether employers 
discriminated against an employee and not whether the employee is disabled. ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009). 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 35 See Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that an impairment that 
is capable of substantially limiting a major life activity, but does not presently do so, cannot be con-
sidered a disability under the ADA); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631, 637 (concluding that HIV is a disabil-
ity protected under the ADA because the disease affects cell growth and other major bodily functions, 
not because it will eventually develop into AIDS); Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 941 F.3d 
331, 335–36 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that obesity is not covered under the ADA as a disability despite 
the medical conditions that might develop as a result). 
 36 See Darby, 964 F.3d at 446 (explaining that a condition only identified as one that may lead to 
a more serious condition later is not covered by the ADA). 
 37 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (explaining that an impairment need not completely prevent 
individuals from performing a major life activity to be considered substantially limiting, but every 
impairment will not be considered a disability). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v). 
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standard that precludes individuals from coverage.40 The Act instructs courts to 
focus on whether employers have complied with their affirmative duty of non-
discrimination instead of on the claimant’s level of impairment.41 
As a whole, the Act calls for a broad interpretation to protect as many in-
dividuals as possible and employs imprecise, non-medical terminology to dis-
tinguish between disabilities that are covered and other, non-covered illnesses 
or impairments.42 Because the ADA lacks a comprehensive list of impairments, 
major activities, or limitations, each claim brought under the ADA requires an 
individualized inquiry.43 
B. Redressing Discrimination Claims Under GINA 
In 2008, Congress passed GINA to alleviate growing fears that genetic 
testing would reveal individuals’ heightened risk for disease, making insurance 
companies less willing to cover the individuals and employers less likely to 
hire them.44 GINA prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information 
                                                                                                                      
 40 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)–(B); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(4), 122 Stat. 3553 (2009) (rejecting several Supreme Court decisions that 
incorrectly interpreted “substantially limits” to “require a greater degree of limitation than was intend-
ed by Congress” and created “too high a standard,” thereby eliminating protection for many otherwise 
qualified individuals). 
 41 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5). The ADA governs the standard the EEOC uses in 
applicable employment actions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) (stating that the regulation’s purpose is to 
implement Title I of the ADA). Both the ADA and subsequent amendments make clear that coverage 
under the ADA is broad and the inquiry should focus on whether discrimination has occurred by de-
termining whether the employer has complied with its statutory obligations. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(A) (stating that courts should interpret “disability” in favor of broad coverage under the 
statute and consistent with the ADAAA); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) (stating that the ADA and ADAAA 
provide “clear, strong, consistent” standards to prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals). 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (stating that courts should interpret the definition of disability in 
favor of broad coverage); Isaac S. Greaney, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of 
Mitigating Measures Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
1267, 1272 (1999) (explaining that every claim under the ADA requires an individualized inquiry 
because key terms like “substantially limits” and “major life activity” are not fully defined in the stat-
ute). When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, an estimated forty-three million Americans were phys-
ically or mentally disabled without a federal remedy for discrimination claims. Americans with Disa-
bilities Act § 2(a)(1). The ADA defines a disability with three elements: (1) a “physical or mental 
impairment” that (2) “substantially limits” (3) “one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1); Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2020) (highlighting the three major 
components of the ADA’s definition of a disability). In providing examples of what may be consid-
ered a substantial limitation or a major life activity, the ADA uses phrases like “such as” and “but not 
limited to,” making clear that these lists are not exhaustive. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 
(1998) (pointing out that the listed examples of life activities and limitations in the statute are illustra-
tive and not exhaustive). Furthermore, the rules of construction provide that the definition of disability 
should be “construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (emphasis added). 
 43 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv); Greaney, supra note 42, at 1272. 
 44 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(1)–(5), 122 Stat. 
881 (2008) (codified in scattered section of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.) (establishing the need to protect 
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in two areas: health insurance (Title I) and employment (Title II).45 Title II bars 
employers from requesting or purchasing genetic information.46 
Proponents of the legislation claimed that civil rights laws, before the 
ADAAA, were insufficient to protect individuals from discrimination on the 
basis of genetic information.47 GINA, however, is not without critics.48 These 
critics suggest, for example, that GINA is ineffective because Americans are 
unaware of the statute, presumably given the short amount of time that genetic 
testing has been available, and that it addresses a non-existent problem. 49 
Plaintiffs have also criticized GINA for the difficulty they face succeeding on 
                                                                                                                      
individuals from genetic discrimination and to encourage people to avail themselves of genetic test-
ing); Areheart, supra note 10, at 722 (suggesting that Congress passed GINA in large part as a re-
sponse to the lagging genetic testing industry); Rick Swedloff, The New Regulatory Imperative for 
Insurance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2031, 2061–62 (2020) (positing that individuals may be disincentivized 
from undergoing genetic testing if insurers could use test results in risk assessments). Although genet-
ic testing became cheaper and more available, the market did not grow, causing life-science investors 
to panic. Areheart, supra note 10, at 722–23. Some scholars have suggested that GINA was a solution 
to boost the struggling genetic testing industry and increase demand for testing by assuring individuals 
that they would not lose their health insurance or be fired based on their genetic test results. Id. at 723. 
 45 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(F), (b)(3) (prohibiting health insurance issuers from establishing ad-
verse rules based on an individual’s genetic information); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information in employment). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a); AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34584, THE GENETIC 
INFORMATION AND NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008 (GINA) 1, 7–8, 13 (2015), http://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34584/16 [https://perma.cc/JP9C-QRMB] (describing the scope of 
GINA’s employment coverage). GINA only created a cognizable claim for disabled individuals in 
health insurance and employment, which is narrower in scope than some civil rights legislation. See 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 101, 201 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
genetic information in health insurance policies and employment decisions); Areheart, supra note 10, 
at 724–25 (comparing GINA’s limited scope, which applies to health insurance and employment, 
against other civil rights laws, which frequently cover employment, public facilities, and government 
services). 
 47 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 444–45 (explaining that lawmakers were concerned that genetic 
information would not be covered under Title I of the ADA as a result of the Supreme Court’s height-
ened standards in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams and Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., giving credence to critics’ arguments that current antidiscrimination laws did not protect 
genetic information). 
 48 See Areheart, supra note 10, at 745 (pointing out that GINA has almost exclusively received 
negative feedback from legal scholars and that it suffers from a general lack of awareness). 
 49 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 469 (explaining that there is little evidence of genetic-based 
discrimination documented or investigated in the health insurance industry and within the scientific 
community); Amanda L. Laedtke et al., Family Physicians’ Awareness and Knowledge of the Genetic 
Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), 21 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 345, 348 (2012) (reporting 
that most American physicians who responded to the survey had no awareness or limited knowledge 
of GINA). Researchers at Northwestern University conducted a survey of 1,500 family physicians 
between 2009 and 2010 to gauge physicians’ concerns over genetic discrimination and their 
knowledge of GINA, which Congress had recently passed. Laedtke, supra, at 347. The results showed 
that 54.5% of responding physicians had no awareness of GINA, and that, among all respondents, 
28.8% said they were only “slightly concerned” about the prospect of genetic discrimination by em-
ployers. Id. at 348. 
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GINA discrimination claims, with many failing to show that their employers in 
fact knew their genetic information.50 
Compared to other areas of civil rights law, there is a noticeable lack of 
case law around genetic information, making it difficult for courts to establish 
the elements of a prima facie case.51 Some courts, however, have held that, in 
an employment discrimination claim under GINA, plaintiffs must establish that 
(1) they were qualified for the position, (2) they were adversely impacted by 
the employment decision, and (3) that the employment decision was based on 
genetic information obtained from testing.52 
C. Facts and Procedural Posture of Darby 
In 2020, in Darby, the Sixth Circuit held that a gene mutation that inhibit-
ed normal cell growth may qualify as a disability under the ADA.53 Plaintiff-
appellant Sherryl Darby sued her former employer alleging that it violated the 
ADA when it fired her after she took medical leave to undergo a double mas-
tectomy.54 
Shortly after starting work at Kids ‘R’ Kids Learning Academy, Darby in-
formed her supervisor that she had breast cancer and would undergo surgery 
later that month.55 Darby’s supervisor scoffed at the idea and insisted that she 
push back her surgery until after her probationary period expired, suggesting 
that Kids ‘R’ Kids would likely fire her if she took time off for surgery during 
that time.56 In fear of losing her job, Darby pushed the date of her surgery 
                                                                                                                      
 50 See Areheart, supra note 10, at 743 (noting that employees are often unable to show that their 
employers know of or possessed their genetic information). 
 51 See Jackson v. Regal Beloit Am., Inc., No. 16-134-CJS, 2018 WL 3078760, at *15 (E.D. Ky. 
June 21, 2018) (stating that the elements for establishing a prima facie case under GINA remain un-
clear). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020); see § 12102(1) (defining “disabil-
ity”). 
 54 Darby, 964 F.3d at 442. The plaintiff initially requested time off to undergo a double mastec-
tomy and told her employer she had been diagnosed with breast cancer. Id. at 442. Childvine, Inc. 
only later found out through discovery that Darby did not have cancer. Id. at 443. Instead, Darby had 
undergone surgery because she tested positive for the BRCA1 mutation and doctors had found epithe-
lial cell growth. Id. 
 55 Id. at 442. Childvine, Inc. is a franchise incorporated in Ohio doing business as Kids ‘R’ Kids. 
SEC’Y OF STATE OF OHIO, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION NO. 20010091142 (2001); see The Kids ‘R’ 
Kids Story, KIDS R KIDS, http://kidsrkids.com/the-kids-r-kids-story/ [https://perma.cc/6Y3J-6XPG] 
(summarizing the creation and expansion of Kids ‘R’ Kids schools across the country). Kids ‘R’ Kids 
Learning Academy is an international education corporation that provides daycare, preschool, and 
kindergarten programs. KIDS ‘R’ KIDS, supra. 
 56 Darby, 964 F.3d at 442. Darby initially requested time off and notified her supervisor, Tyler 
Mayhugh, of her alleged breast cancer diagnosis within the ninety-day probationary period for new 
employees. Id. A probationary period is a “trial period” that typically begins after an employee is 
hired, and it generally lasts between three and six months. WOLTERS KLUWER, HR COMPLIANCE 
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back, but her two supervisors continued to harass her about the length of time 
she had requested for leave.57 Darby’s supervisor eventually approved her re-
quest, but when she contacted Kids ‘R’ Kids to discuss returning to work after 
her surgery, a supervisor told her to bring a medical release.58 When Darby re-
turned to work with her medical release as instructed, her supervisor stated that 
her employment had already been terminated.59 Days later, Darby received a 
termination letter dated October 24th—the last day of her ninety-day proba-
tionary period.60 
Darby sued her former employer in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio, claiming that it had violated her rights under Title I of the 
ADA and that the reasons cited for her termination were pretextual.61 In her 
complaint, Darby asserted that she had breast cancer.62 This, however, was 
false; Darby did not have cancer.63 Rather, Darby had tested positive for the 
BRCA1 genetic mutation and had been diagnosed with abnormal cell growth.64 
Darby requested to submit an amended complaint wherein she would allege 
that because the BRCA1 gene limits normal cell growth and contributes to the 
growth of abnormal cells, she was disabled.65 In other words, she wished to 
                                                                                                                      
LIBRARY ¶ 46, 110 (2020). During this trial period, employers can evaluate a new employee’s perfor-
mance and may terminate their employment at will. Id. 
 57 Darby, 964 F.3d at 442–43. Darby’s complaint named both her supervisor Tyler Mayhugh and the 
franchise co-owner Samantha Doczy. Id. Although Samantha Doczy later went by Samantha Blizzard, 
the court continued to refer to her as “Doczy” for consistency. Darby v. Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-
00669, 2019 WL 6170743, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2019), rev’d 964 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 58 Darby, 964 F.3d at 442–43. Doczy approved Darby’s request for time off but only after Darby 
agreed to use her vacation and sick days for recovery time. Id. at 443. A medical release form grants a 
physician the right to share medical information with third parties on behalf of a patient. Employers & 
Health Information in the Workplace, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/employers-health-information-workplace/index. html [https://perma.
cc/P2F3-7C5E]. Employers may use these forms to certify that an employee is able to return to work 
or obtain other information from an employee’s physician. Id. 
 59 Darby, 964 F.3d at 443. 
 60 Id. Darby received a termination letter by mail days after her initial return to work. Id. 
 61 Id. Childvine, Inc. cited Darby’s “‘unpleasant’ attitude, dress code violations, and ‘being una-
ble to work’” as reasons for her termination. Id. 
 62 Id.; Amended Complaint & Jury Demand at 3, Darby v. Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-00669 (S.D. 
Ohio Nov. 16, 2018). 
 63 Darby, 964 F.3d at 443. 
 64 Id. Childvine, Inc. only found out that Darby did not have cancer after initial discovery. Id. 
Medical records showed that Darby had only tested positive for the BRCA1 genetic mutation and that 
she had a family history of cancer. Id. The “breast cancer 1” gene, commonly known as BRCA1, can 
prevent humans from developing certain cancers when functioning properly. The BRCA1 and BRCA2 
Genes, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ genomics/disease/breast_
ovarian_cancer/genes_hboc.htm [https://perma.cc/S6EM-HXXP]. Conversely, individuals with a 
mutation in the BRCA1 gene have a 70% lifetime risk of developing breast cancer, as compared to 
approximately 12% in non-carriers. Lukas Semmler et al., BRCA1 and Breast Cancer: A Review of the 
Underlying Mechanisms Resulting in the Tissue-Specific Tumorigenesis in Mutation Carriers, 22 J. 
BREAST CANCER 1, 2 (2019). 
 65 Darby, 964 F.3d at 443. 
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allege that her disability was covered under the ADA because the genetic mu-
tation and epithelial cell growth substantially limited the major life activity of 
normal cell growth.66 Rather than allowing Darby to submit the amended com-
plaint, the district court had Darby make a number of admissions, including 
that she tested positive for the BRCA1 genetic mutation, which the court ulti-
mately treated as part of her complaint.67 
Childvine filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Darby failed to plausi-
bly allege she was disabled under the ADA.68 The district court found that 
Darby’s diagnosis with the BRCA1 gene was equivalent to “the absence of 
cancer” and granted Childvine’s motion.69 In doing so, the district court held 
that conditions which may lead to a disease in the future are not “physical im-
pairments” within the meaning of § 12102(1).70 Darby appealed the district 
court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit.71 In a case of first impression at the circuit 
level, the Sixth Circuit held that Darby plausibly alleged that the genetic muta-
tion may be a disability covered by the ADA, reversing the district court’s rul-
ing and remanding the case for further proceedings.72 
                                                                                                                      
 66 Id.; see Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 62, at 3 (arguing how Darby was able 
to succeed on her ADA claim). 
 67 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445. During the course of discovery, and after the defendant uncovered that 
Darby had never been diagnosed with breast cancer, Darby requested to amend her complaint to re-
flect eight admissions. Id. at 443. Among these admissions, Darby revealed that (1) her gynecologist 
discovered abnormal cell growth and recommended genetic testing, (2) she had tested positive for the 
BRCA1 genetic mutation, (3) the BRCA1 gene substantially limits normal cell growth, and (4) her 
doctors recommended she undergo surgery because of the BRCA1 gene. Id. Darby challenged the 
district court’s decision to treat the admissions as part of her complaint, alleging that the court erred in 
not treating the motion to amend her complaint as one for summary judgment pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and that she was unable to address fully her proposed amendment to the 
district court. Id. at 444; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
 68 Defendant Childvine’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Darby v. Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-00669 
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2019). 
 69 Darby, 964 F.3d at 443–44; see also Darby v. Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-00669, 2019 WL 
6170743, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2019), rev’d 964 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2020). (“[T]his is not a cir-
cumstance akin to remission of cancer. Rather, it is presently, the absence of cancer.”). The district 
court also emphasized the potential danger in allowing Darby’s claim to proceed. Darby, 2019 WL 
6170743, at *4. The court reasoned that expanding the definition of disability to include any condition 
that may lead to disability in the future could ostensibly bring all employees under the ADAAA. Id. 
The district court’s finding that the BRCA1 mutation was not a present disability is analogous to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, where it held that HIV was a qualified disability 
because of its “constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems 
from the moment of infection.” See 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (holding that HIV is a “disability” be-
cause of its present physical impairment, not because it could eventually develop into AIDS); Darby, 
2019 WL 6170743, at *4 (holding that Darby’s genetic mutation did not constitute a present physical 
impairment, like HIV did, and dismissing Darby’s complaint). 
 70 Darby, 2019 WL 6170743, at *4. 
 71 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445. 
 72 Id. at 445, 447. The Sixth Circuit also determined that Darby sufficiently pleaded all elements 
of her discrimination claim. Id. at 447. The Sixth Circuit determined that because the district court 
evaluated Darby’s admissions as if they were part of her complaint, they did not consider matters 
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II. RESTORING THE BREADTH OF ADA COVERAGE 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to provide clear guidelines that would 
protect disabled Americans from discrimination in all aspects of life.73 After 
the ADA’s passage but before the ADAAA, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed 
the ADA’s scope by implementing stricter standards for individuals to prove 
they are “disabled.”74 Section A of this Part describes the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Darby v. Childvine, Inc.75 Section B 
explains the impact of the ADAAA on the Sixth Circuit’s decision.76 
A. Why Did the Sixth Circuit Allow Darby’s Claim to Proceed? 
In 2020, in Darby, the Sixth Circuit held that Darby plausibly alleged that 
the BRCA1 genetic mutation qualifies as a disability under the ADA for the 
purpose of surviving a motion to dismiss.77 The court, however, did not deter-
mine whether the BRCA1 genetic mutation, or any genetic mutation, is in fact 
a disability.78 
To establish a case under Title I of the ADA, claimants must first establish 
they are disabled.79 Thus, Darby was required to show, at the pleading stage, 
that it is at least plausible that the BRCA1 mutation and epithelial cell growth 
substantially limited her normal cell growth, as compared to the general popu-
lation.80 To do so, Darby alleged that doctors discovered an abnormal cell 
growth, that genetic testing revealed the BRCA1 genetic mutation, which im-
pairs normal cell growth, and that her doctors recommended a double mastec-
tomy as a result.81 
                                                                                                                      
outside of the pleadings to trigger Rule 12(d). FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Darby, 964 F.3d at 444; see FED. 
R. CIV. P. 15(a) (allowing plaintiffs to amend pleadings before trial). Furthermore, Darby alleged she 
was unable to present formally her amendment to the district court. Darby, 964 F.3d at 444. The Sixth 
Circuit, however, did not take issue with the district court’s management of the admissions because 
she did not make any other claims outside of the amendment. Id. 
 73 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990). 
 74 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 3553 
(2009) (noting that the Supreme Court’s holdings resulted in eliminating protection for many individ-
uals who were intended to be afforded protection under the ADA). 
 75 See infra notes 77–93 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 94–115 and accompanying text. 
 77 Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 442 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 78 Id. at 447. 
 79 Id. at 444. 
 80 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii), (v) (2020) (stating that an impairment 
will rise to the level of disability under the ADA where it substantially limits an individual’s ability to 
perform a major life activity compared to the general population and explaining that a scientific in-
quiry or finding is not required to make these comparisons). 
 81 Darby, 964 F.3d at 443. 
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After establishing their disability, claimants must also show (1) they are 
qualified to perform the job, (2) with reasonable accommodation, and (3) that 
they suffered an adverse employment action because of their disability.82 Dar-
by satisfied the first and second elements because she alleged that with the rea-
sonable accommodation of a medical leave of absence, she could perform the 
essential functions required of an administrative assistant.83 Finally, Darby 
pleaded several facts that satisfied the third element, including her supervisor’s 
doubt as to whether she would remain employed if Darby did not delay the 
surgery, both supervisors’ continued harassment over the length of her request-
ed leave, and the fact that her termination letter was dated for the last day of 
her probationary period.84 
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Sixth Circuit only reviewed whether 
Darby’s discrimination claim, taken as true, was redressable under the ADA.85 
The court held that, because Darby sufficiently alleged that she is disabled, she 
satisfied the first prong of an ADA claim.86 To reach this conclusion, the Sixth 
Circuit conducted an individualized inquiry with respect to each of the three 
major requirements of a § 12102(1) disability and concluded that the BRCA1 
mutation could constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited the 
major life activity of normal cell growth.87 Citing the ADAAA’s rules of con-
struction in defining “disability,” the Sixth Circuit interpreted disability in fa-
vor of maximum coverage.88 Because Darby did not have to prove that her 
BRCA1 gene in fact caused her abnormal cell growth nor that the gene sub-
stantially limited normal cell growth at the time of her lawsuit, the court rea-
soned it is plausible that the BRCA1 mutation rises to the level of disability 
                                                                                                                      
 82 Id. at 444 (laying out the elements of an ADA Title I claim); Michael v. City of Troy Police 
Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (same); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (explaining the rules of construction for identifying dis-
crimination in employment settings). The ADA broadly defines reasonable accommodations and pro-
vides a list of examples, such as making existing structures accessible to disabled individuals, provid-
ing training or implementing new policies, or modifying an employee’s work schedule. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(9). 
 83 Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 62, at 3, 5; Darby, 964 F.3d at 447. 
 84 Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 62, at 3–4; Darby, 964 F.3d at 442–43, 447 
(explaining that Darby’s termination alone could not establish causation, but that Darby pleaded other 
facts that plausibly established discrimination). 
 85 Darby, 964 F.3d at 444; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that plaintiffs 
must state a plausible claim for relief, not one that merely alleges the possibility of the defendant’s 
liability, to survive a motion to dismiss); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs must allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief to survive a motion to dis-
miss). 
 86 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445–46. 
 87 Id. at 447 (“While reference to additional sources might yield a second opinion on these medi-
cal questions, Darby’s factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”). 
 88 Id. at 445; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (providing guidance for courts that encourages “broad 
coverage” when determining whether a plaintiff’s impairment qualifies as a “disability”). 
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based on Darby’s complaint.89 After plausibly alleging that her BRCA1 genetic 
mutation plausibly rendered her disabled, Darby sufficiently pleaded the re-
maining elements to establish a prima facie case under Title I.90 
By its own admission, the Sixth Circuit’s holding is quite narrow, as it 
merely kept open the possibility that a genetic mutation is a disability as de-
fined by the ADA.91 Relying on Bragdon v. Abbott, a 1998 case wherein the 
Supreme Court held that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is a disa-
bility under the ADA even during the asymptomatic phase, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that Darby had only plausibly alleged a present substantial limita-
tion on normal cell growth.92 Therefore, had the case not settled, the principal 
issue on remand would likely have been whether the BRCA1 mutation present-
ly and substantially affects normal cell growth in a manner similar to HIV.93 
B. A Pivotal Moment: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
It remains unclear whether discovery on remand would have produced 
medical evidence supporting Darby’s claim.94 What is clear, however, is that 
                                                                                                                      
 89 Darby, 964 F.3d at 445. Citing corresponding federal regulations to the ADA, the Sixth Circuit 
explained that cancer is among several specifically listed impairments that, “at a minimum,” substan-
tially limit major life activities. Darby, 964 F.3d at 446; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2020) (stat-
ing that cancer substantially limits the major life activity of normal cell growth). The court interpreted 
this language as Congress setting “a floor, not a ceiling,” therefore supporting the conclusion that 
Darby plausibly alleged that her genetic mutation and epithelial cell growth rendered her disabled. 
Darby, 964 F.3d at 446. 
 90 Darby, 964 F.3d at 447; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–(b) (prohibiting workplace discrimination on 
the basis of disability). 
 91 Darby, 964 F.3d at 446. 
 92 Id. at 447. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that HIV is a physical impairment 
that substantially limits at least one major life activity at every stage of the disease, including its 
asymptomatic phase. 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). In 1994, dentist Randon Bragdon found a cavity dur-
ing the course of patient Sidney Abbott’s dental exam. Id. at 628–29. Doctors diagnosed Abbott with 
HIV in 1986 and disclosed her disease to Bragdon prior to the exam. Id. at 628. At the time of her 
appointment, Abbott was in the asymptomatic phase of the disease. Id. After discovering the cavity, 
Bragdon informed Abbott that he does not perform cavity fillings on patients with HIV but that he 
would perform the procedure at a local hospital. Id. at 629. Abbott refused his offer and sued under 
Title III of the ADA claiming Bragdon discriminated against her on the basis of disability. Id. 
 93 Darby, 964 F.3d at 446. The Sixth Circuit explained that, in Bragdon, HIV qualified as a disa-
bility because of its present and constant effect on an individual’s cell growth and function, not be-
cause the disease will progress into AIDS. Id.; see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (explaining that HIV is a 
disability because of its effect on an individual’s cell function from initial infection through every 
stage of the disease). Determining whether the BRCA1 genetic mutation substantially limits cell 
growth, as well as whether it caused Darby’s abnormal cell growth, requires medical expertise and 
testimony. Darby, 964 F.3d at 447. Ultimately, the parties settled out of court, and the district court 
dismissed the case on November 18, 2020, without reviewing any such medical evidence. Darby v. 
Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-00669 (S.D. Ohio dismissed Nov. 18, 2020). 
 94 See Darby, 964 F.3d at 446 (noting that the district court should follow the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bragdon by allowing the plaintiff’s claim to move forward so the court could consider 
medical evidence in later discovery). 
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without Congress’s passage of the ADAAA in 2008, the claim would have 
been dismissed.95 Prior to the ADAAA, the ADA did not define “major life 
activities,” provide any examples of actions or bodily functions that could be 
considered “major life activities,” nor define “substantially limits.”96 
With only regulatory agency interpretations to guide it, the Supreme 
Court narrowly interpreted the ADA’s scope of protection and effectively de-
nied coverage to the individuals Congress designed the statute to protect.97 For 
example, in 2002, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 
the Court held that to substantially limit major life activities, and thus be consid-
ered a disability, an impairment must “severely restrict[]” individuals from per-
forming an activity “of central importance to most people’s daily lives.”98 In 
                                                                                                                      
 95 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
§ 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553 (2009) (explaining that the amendment serves to reject and correct several Su-
preme Court holdings that resulted in eliminating protection for many individuals who Congress in-
tended to protect under the ADA). 
 96 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). Because 
the original legislation remained silent on what constituted a major life activity, courts relied heavily 
on regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services that interpreted the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2020) (defining major life activities as “caring for one’s 
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”). 
Unlike the current definitions, the Department of Health and Human Services regulations did not, and 
still do not, suggest that the list is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. Compare 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2) (explaining major life activities “include, but are not limited to” those specifically named 
in the statute), with Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3(2) (failing to provide any examples 
of major life activities), and 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (suggesting the list of major life activities is 
exhaustive by omitting phrases like “but not limited to”). Like the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the EEOC created its own regulations interpreting the definition of “substantially limits.” 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(4). The EEOC regulations determined whether an impairment sub-
stantially limited an individual’s activities such that it rose to the level of disability by comparing that 
individual’s ability to that of “the average person in the general population.” Id. Following the 
ADAAA, the EEOC updated the federal regulations to include rules of construction for interpreting 
“substantially limits” in favor of broad coverage, making clear that an impairment need not complete-
ly prevent individuals from performing a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2020). 
 97 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (stating that the statute requires strict interpretation to create a 
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 
(1999) (holding that corrective or ameliorative measures must be taken into consideration when de-
termining whether an individual’s physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity and is thus disabled), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(3). 
 98 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams, the plaintiff, Ella Williams, began to experience neck and shoulder pain as a result of her 
work at Toyota’s manufacturing plant in Kentucky, and doctors diagnosed her with bilateral carpal 
tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis, among other maladies. Id. at 187, 189. In 1993, plant super-
visors placed Williams on a quality control team where she was only required to visually inspect 
painted cars for flaws during assembly and to wipe painted cars with a glove. Id. at 188–89. Approxi-
mately three years later, in 1996, Williams’s role changed to include several manual tasks, requiring 
her to keep her arms raised for hours at a time. Id. at 189. According to Williams’s complaint, her 
conditions worsened, and she requested to return to her original tasks, but doctors placed her under a 
“no-work-of-any-kind restriction.” Id. at 190. Williams’s last day of work at the plant was in Decem-
ber 1996, and, on January 27, 1997, Toyota informed Williams that it had terminated her employment 
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Toyota, the Court found that the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA be-
cause her carpal tunnel syndrome and related physical impairments only lim-
ited her ability to perform specific work-related manual tasks but did not limit 
daily tasks of central importance to most people’s lives.99 Thus, the Court’s 
holding narrowed the scope of protection under the ADA by heightening the 
“substantial limitation” standard.100 
Similarly, in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., the Court held that individuals 
claiming a disability under the ADA must be evaluated with respect to the 
ameliorative effects of corrective or mitigating measures.101 In Sutton, twin 
sisters who both suffered from severe nearsightedness sued United, alleging 
discrimination under the ADA after the airline did not offer the women jobs as 
commercial pilots for failing to meet the minimum vision requirement.102 Both 
                                                                                                                      
due to poor attendance. Id. at 190–91. Williams sued her former employer in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Kentucky alleging discrimination and failure to accommodate her disability. 
Id. at 190. 
 99 Id. at 201–02 (explaining that although the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome prevented her 
from keeping her arms raised for extended periods of times at work, she was able to bathe, brush her 
teeth, and perform other household chores); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (citing a long list of “major life 
activities,” including walking, sleeping, eating, breathing, and caring for oneself). In cases where the 
plaintiff’s major life activity was “working,” courts would only find that individuals were disabled if 
their impairments substantially limited their employment generally. See Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 
Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40 (2007) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s narrow interpretation of the ADA whereby only individuals who were too severely disabled to 
work would be covered under the statue). In other words, courts would only determine that an indi-
vidual was disabled if the individual was severely restricted in performing a broad class of jobs as 
compared to an average person performing the same job. See Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 
F.3d 435, 440–41 (8th Cir. 2007) (determining that a former nurse was not disabled due to her cocaine 
addiction because she was only precluded from performing a job with special patient concerns, not 
general nursing jobs); Hall v. Claussen, 6 F. App’x 655, 670 (10th Cir. 2001) (allowing a former em-
ployee’s ADA claim to proceed because his urological condition prevented him from performing a 
broad range of jobs in law enforcement); Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.2d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 
1998) (holding that an employee’s back injury did not render her disabled because she was not signifi-
cantly restricted from performing a broad class of jobs); Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Sys., Inc., 
122 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding an employee’s ADA claim failed because his inability to 
lift objects during the general course of his work did not render him disabled, and, furthermore, the 
plaintiff was showing signs of recovery at the time of his dismissal); Branch v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that an employee was not disabled because 
his carpal tunnel syndrome only precluded him from repetitive work with power tools and did not 
prevent him from performing a substantial set of jobs). 
 100 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(a)(5); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
 101 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2)–(3); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. Corrective or mitigat-
ing measures are defined in the ADA as medication, prosthetics, or any assistive technology intended 
to reduce an impairment’s effect. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). Eyeglasses and contact lenses do not fall 
into this category and are fully considered when evaluating whether an impairment rises to the level of 
disability. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii). 
 102 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475–76. Myopia, or nearsightedness, is a condition where individuals can 
see objects close to them clearly, but objects farther away are blurry. Myopia (Nearsightedness), AM. 
OPTOMETRIC ASS’N, https://www.aoa.org/healthy-eyes/eye-and-vision-conditions/myopia?sso=y 
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women were qualified for the position and had near perfect vision with correc-
tive lenses, but United based its decision on the plaintiffs’ uncorrected vision 
levels.103 The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish a 
disability under the ADA because, with corrective measures, they are not in 
fact disabled.104 In so holding, the Court concluded that courts must take into 
account all corrective measures when determining whether an individual is 
disabled under the ADA.105 
As a result of these holdings, many individuals who were substantially 
limited in major life activities due to physical and mental impairments could 
not prove they were in fact disabled.106 This created a “catch-22” for individu-
als seeking relief in employment discrimination cases: courts frequently con-
cluded that only plaintiffs who were so severely impaired that they could not 
work were “disabled” under the ADA.107 Thus, plaintiffs who were impaired 
                                                                                                                      
[https://perma.cc/6YB3-6LVV]. Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton both had uncorrected vision that 
fell below United Airline’s minimum requirement for pilots. Sutton, 526 U.S. at 475–76. 
 103 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475–76. With corrective measures such as glasses or contact lenses, both 
women had visual acuities of 20/20 or better. Id. at 475. Additionally, the plaintiffs both met United 
Airline’s age, education, and experience requirements and had the appropriate Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration qualifications. Id. at 475–76. 
 104 Id. at 482. 
 105 Id. The Court reasoned that because Congress specifically called for the protection of 43 mil-
lion Americans with disabilities, the presumably large number of Americans whose impairments were 
corrected with medication or other mitigating measures should not be considered disabled under the 
ADA. Id. at 486. The Court in Sutton also expressly rejected the EEOC’s guidelines at the time, which 
stated that whether an individual was substantially limited in a major life activity, and thus was disa-
bled, should be determined without regard to corrective measures. Id. at 481–82. The Court also held 
that the plaintiffs’ nearsightedness only prevented them from being “global airline pilots,” not from per-
forming a broad class of jobs, and, thus, they were not substantially limited. Id. at 493. In addition to 
Sutton, the Supreme Court released two accompanying decisions that together are often referred to as 
“The Sutton Trilogy.” See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 
519 (1999) (holding that an employee’s hypertension did not render him disabled because with proper 
medication he was not restricted from working and could function normally as compared to other 
individuals); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (reversing the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s ruling that the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA and finding that a plaintiff without vision 
in one eye was not in fact disabled because he had learned to adjust and subconsciously correct his 
vision). These decisions ultimately precluded individuals from coverage under the ADA because med-
ication and other corrective measures usually treated claimants’ impairments, eliminating millions of 
Americans’ ability to redress workplace discrimination claims. Perry Meadows & Richard A. Bales, 
Using Mitigating Measures to Determine Disability under The Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 
S.D. L. REV. 33, 35 (2000). 
 106 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(1)–(5); see also Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195, 201 
(holding that the claimant was not disabled because her multiple diagnoses did not severely restrict 
her “from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”). 
 107 See Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAAA, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 509, 523–24 (2011) (describing that plaintiffs who tried to show they were substantially 
limited in the major life activity of “working” would only be deemed disabled if they were so limited 
they were unable to work); Colker, supra note 99, at 40 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation was so rigid that only individuals who were too severely disabled to work could be protected 
under the statute). 
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and substantially limited in working would not be deemed “disabled” because 
their impairment did not prevent them from employment generally.108 The 
ADA, which sought to allow full participation and economic viability for disa-
bled Americans, became ineffective for plaintiffs.109 In fact, in 1999, ninety-
three percent of plaintiffs’ claims failed in reported employment discrimination 
cases.110 
This was the impetus for Congress’s passage of the ADAAA.111 The 
ADAAA’s purpose was to reject the holdings in Toyota and Sutton that elimi-
nated protection for some otherwise qualified individuals and that were contra-
ry to Congress’s intent.112 In the ADAAA, Congress included rules of con-
struction for interpreting the definition of disability that demanded broad cov-
erage consistent with the stated purposes of the statute as amended.113 Con-
gress also added illustrative examples of major life activities ranging from 
“lifting” and “thinking” to “functions of the immune system” to overrule the 
“central importance to most people’s daily lives” standard espoused in Toyo-
ta.114 The ADAAA also stated that courts cannot consider the mitigating effects 
of medication or corrective measures in determining whether an impairment is 
a disability, thereby rejecting Sutton.115 
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY ALLOWED DARBY’S  
CLAIM TO PROCEED 
In evaluating Darby’s claim, the Sixth Circuit embraced the ADAAA’s in-
clusive provisions, which pushed courts to be less stringent in evaluating 
                                                                                                                      
 108 Colker, supra note 99, at 40 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “overly rigid standard” resulted 
in fewer disabled Americans being covered under the ADA). 
 109 Colker, supra note 8, at 160 (suggesting that courts have been quick to grant summary judg-
ment by setting high standards for evidentiary proof of a disability and that reliance on summary 
judgment results in favorable decisions for employers by preventing claims from reaching more plain-
tiff-friendly juries). 
 110 Id. at 100 (stating that defendants in employment discrimination cases succeed 93% of the 
time and defendants succeed in 84% of reported appealed decisions). 
 111 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5) (stating that the primary focus of an ADA claim 
must be whether an employer has violated the statute, not whether the claimant is disabled). 
 112 Id. §§ 2(b)(1)–(5); 4(a); see Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 
(2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(4)–(5); Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(3). 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (instructing that individuals should be covered under the ADA “to the 
maximum extent permitted”); ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(1)–(5) (rejecting both the 
Court’s higher standard of limitation and narrow scope, neither of which reflected congressional in-
tent). 
 114 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(4). 
 115 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E) (stating that determinations of whether an individual is disabled 
should be made irrespective of ameliorative effects, except for the effects of “ordinary eyeglasses or 
contact lenses”). 
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whether an impairment constitutes a disability.116 Section A of this Part argues 
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was correct to allow Dar-
by’s claim to proceed because it follows congressional intent in expanding 
coverage under the statute.117 Section B argues that Darby could not have 
brought a claim under the GINA and, as such, her only means of redress would 
have fallen under the ADA.118 
A. Darby Sufficiently Pleaded She Was Disabled to Survive a  
Motion to Dismiss in Accordance with the ADAAA 
In 2020, in Darby v. Childvine, Inc., the Sixth Circuit correctly allowed 
Darby’s claim, including that she was disabled due to her BRCA1 genetic mu-
tation and epithelial cell growth, to move forward given the expanded defini-
tion of a disability under the ADAAA.119 The Sixth Circuit’s holding embraced 
the tenets of the ADAAA to reaffirm that courts should interpret the statute in 
favor of broad coverage and protection, as Congress intended.120 The 
ADAAA’s stated purpose was to reverse the Supreme Court’s decisions in cas-
es like Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams and Sutton v. 
United Airlines, Inc., both of which eliminated coverage for many otherwise 
qualified individuals by creating standards that made it nearly impossible to 
demonstrate a disability.121 Indeed, many cases brought prior to the ADAAA 
focused on whether the claimant was disabled, instead of whether the employ-
er had discriminated against the employee.122 The ADAAA shifted the focus to 
whether discrimination had occurred, stating that establishing a disability un-
der the statute should not be challenging for plaintiffs.123 
The Sixth Circuit suggested that the district court, on remand, consider 
whether Bragdon v. Abbott could serve as a useful comparison in determining 
                                                                                                                      
 116 Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that Darby plausibly al-
leged she was disabled when considering the ADA “to the maximum extent permitted by [its] terms” 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12012(4))). 
 117 See infra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text. 
 119 See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008) (redefining the statutory definition of “disability” to expand protection under the ADA). 
 120 See id. § 2(b)(1) (stating that the ADAAA seeks to reinstate “clear, strong, consistent, enforce-
able standards” to protect disabled Americans); Darby, 964 F.3d at 445 (holding that, “to the maxi-
mum extent permitted” by the ADA, Darby had sufficiently pleaded that she was disabled). 
 121 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2)–(5) (explaining the purpose of the amendments and 
rejecting the Court’s holdings in Toyota and Sutton). 
 122 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (focusing the Court’s inquiry on 
whether the plaintiff’s HIV rendered her disabled under the ADA); Darby, 964 F.3d at 445 (evaluat-
ing whether plaintiff Darby’s BRCA1 genetic mutation and epithelial cell growth rendered her disa-
bled under the ADA). 
 123 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5). 
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the BRCA1 gene mutation’s effect on the human body.124 Following Bragdon, 
the inquiry for the district court would have been whether the BRCA1 gene mu-
tation has a “constant and detrimental effect” on Darby’s normal cell growth.125 
In other words, the Sixth Circuit implied that the district court should evaluate 
whether the BRCA1 genetic mutation operates similarly to HIV in the body.126 
Although it is unclear whether Darby would have prevailed on remand, allowing 
similar claims to proceed beyond summary judgment presents tangible benefits 
to plaintiffs: when plaintiffs survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the likeli-
hood of settling, as well as the amount of the potential settlement, increase sub-
stantially.127 
B. Darby’s Claim Would Likely Have Failed Under GINA Because She Did 
Not Disclose Genetic Information to Her Employer 
The Sixth Circuit noted that Darby may have had a cognizable claim un-
der GINA because the BRCA1 mutation is genetic information gleaned from 
genetic testing.128 This, however, is incorrect.129 Because Darby never dis-
closed her BRCA1 mutation to her employer and instead claimed she had 
breast cancer, a claim under GINA would have been unlikely to succeed. 130 
Therefore, Darby’s ADA claim was likely her only means of redress.131 
                                                                                                                      
 124 Darby, 964 F.3d at 446 (noting that the Supreme Court decided Bragdon at summary judg-
ment, which gave the Court an opportunity to evaluate medical evidence concerning HIV’s effect on 
the body). 
 125 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (holding that HIV qualifies as a disability under the ADA be-
cause it is a physiological disorder that immediately and constantly impairs normal life activities); 
Darby v. Childvine, Inc., No. 18-cv-00669 (S.D. Ohio dismissed Nov. 18, 2020) (dismissing the case 
on remand following a settlement between Darby and Childvine). 
 126 Darby, 964 F.3d at 446; see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (holding that HIV is a disability be-
cause of its constant detrimental effect on the body’s normal functions). The Sixth Circuit referenced 
Bragdon and even suggested that the BRCA1 mutation could be held as a disability under the ADA if 
Darby can produce medical and factual evidence analogizing the effect of BRCA1 in the body to that 
of HIV. Darby, 964 F.3d at 446; see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (concluding that HIV is a disability 
because of its immediate and constant detrimental effect on major bodily functions, as required by the 
statute). 
 127 See Darby, 964 F.3d at 446 (explaining that additional medical evidence and further factfind-
ing would have been required to decide whether Darby is disabled); Nicole Buonocore Porter, The 
New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014) (describing the benefits of the ADAAA’s broader 
protection for plaintiffs). On remand, the district court dismissed the case after the parties settled out 
of court for an undisclosed amount. Darby, No. 18-cv-00669 (S.D. Ohio dismissed Nov. 18, 2020). 
 128 Darby, 964 F.3d at 447. 
 129 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (outlawing discrimination in employment on the basis of an em-
ployee’s known genetic information); Darby, 964 F.3d at 443 (stating that the employer only found 
out about Darby’s BRCA1 genetic mutation through discovery and, therefore, did not know her genet-
ic information when it fired Darby). 
 130 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting adverse decisions against employees on the basis of 
the employee’s genetic information); Darby, 964 F.3d at 443 (stating that Darby told her former em-
ployer that she had breast cancer, not that she tested positive for the BRCA1 genetic mutation). Sec-
tion 2000ff-1(a) of GINA implicitly imposes a knowledge element on the employer—the employer 
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To succeed on a GINA claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were 
qualified for the position, they were adversely impacted, and the employment ac-
tion was based on genetic information obtained from testing.132 As such, GINA 
imposes a knowledge requirement on the employer.133 If the employer is unaware 
of or does not possess the employee’s genetic information, it cannot take an ad-
verse employment action based on that genetic information.134 Childvine was not 
aware of the BRCA1 gene mutation until after Darby sued for discrimination and, 
therefore, under GINA, Childvine did not discriminate against Darby.135 
CONCLUSION 
Darby v. Childvine, Inc. offers a glimpse into how the ADA may interact 
with newly discoverable diseases and impairments as medical advancements 
continue into the twenty-first century. The ADAAA breathed new life into the 
statute to be as flexible as possible, creating opportunities for unknown im-
pairments to be brought under the ADA’s protection. The Sixth Circuit proper-
ly allowed Darby’s claim to proceed and fulfilled Congress’s intent for greater 
protection under the ADAAA. The holding, however, left open the possibility 
of whether a genetic mutation is a disability and ultimately punted the question 
to future medical research. Moving forward, courts must be steadfast in using the  
                                                                                                                      
must know the employee’s genetic information and must make an adverse employment decision based 
on that information. See § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees 
or potential employees based on known genetic information). Based on Darby’s pleading, Childvine, 
Inc., Mayhugh, and Doczy all lacked the requisite knowledge for Darby to bring a claim under GINA. 
See id. (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of genetic information known by the 
employer); Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 62, at 2 (alleging that Darby had breast 
cancer). 
 131 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against individuals on 
the basis of genetic information); id. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against 
individuals on the basis of disability). 
 132 Jackson v. Regal Beloit Am., Inc., No. 16-134-CJS, 2018 WL 3078760, at *15 (E.D. Ky. June 
21, 2018) (describing the elements of a genetic discrimination claim under GINA, noting that there is 
little consensus among courts due to the lack of caselaw regarding the statute). 
 133 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a). 
 134 See Amended Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 62, at 2 (claiming that Darby told her 
supervisors she had breast cancer, not that she had a BRCA1 mutation); Areheart, supra note 10, at 
743 (stating that employees’ claims brought under GINA often fail because they cannot prove that 
their employer possessed or was aware of their genetic information). 
 135 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (outlawing discrimination in employment on the basis of an em-
ployee’s genetic information); Darby, 964 F.3d at 443 (stating that Darby’s employer only found out 
about her BRCA1 genetic mutation through discovery, after Darby had already filed her claim). Had 
all the facts remained the same and Darby told her employer that she was diagnosed with epithelial cell 
growth and a BRCA1 gene mutation as a result of genetic testing, Darby may have been able to seek a 
remedy under GINA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee on 
the basis of known genetic information). 
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ADAAA’s more inclusive standards to accommodate medical discoveries of the 
future and provide legal protection to those most vulnerable in our society. 
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